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TOW ARD A UNIVERSAL 
STANDARD: FREE EXERCISE AND 
THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 
Since 1980, congregations of churches located on the Mexican-
American border have consciously broken federal law by trans-
porting and sheltering aliens from Central America. This con-
certed effort by churches is known as the "Sanctuary Move-
ment," and those church members responsible for the actions 
taken are known as "Sanctuary workers."1 The federal govern-
ment has responded to this illegal activity by successfully prose-
cuting and imprisoning many of the Sanctuary workers in the 
border areas. 2 
1. "Sanctuary" in this context simply refers to the ancient right claimed by churches 
to shield from whatever authority those people whom they consider in need of protec-
tion. This is the broadest statement of the churches' right. Precisely due to its breadth 
(and the frequency of its assertion), various governments at various times have sought to 
limit the right. For an excellent historical survey of the right of sanctuary, see Project on 
the Sanctuary Movement, 21 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 493 (1986). 
2. Blodgett, Sanctuary: Church Workers Face Trial, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 19; Ap-
plebome, 3 More are Given Probation in Alien Smuggling, N. Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at 
7, col. 1; Taylor, 16 Indicted by U.S. in Bid to End Church Smuggling of Latin Aliens, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 3; see, e.g., United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Remer-Thamert, No. 87-476 (D.N.M. Aug. 4, 1987); United 
States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); United States v. Socorro, No. CR 85-
008 PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 1985). 
In Elder, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 150 days imprisonment at a 
halfway house, while Merkt received a 179-day jail term and three years of probation. 
Top Court Rejects Alien Helpers' Plea, Detroit News, March 31, 1987, at 3A, col. 1. 
"Amnesty International has added [Merkt's] name to its list of worldwide prisoners of 
conscience." Id. In the highly publicized Arizona trials, eight· of the original 11 defend-
ants were convicted on May 1, 1986, though all received suspended sentences ranging 
from three to five years each. Applebome, supra, at 7, col. 1. Although the prosecutions 
have been limited to the border areas so far, the Sanctuary Movement now includes 
churches throughout the country, as explained infra, note 13. 
The law under which the prosecutions of Sanctuary workers have proceeded, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324 (Supp. IV 1986), states, in relevant part: 
(a) Criminal penalties 
(1) Any person who-
(A) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring 
to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place 
other than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated 
by the Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior 
official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States 
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This Note will first look at the combination of circumstances 
and beliefs that compel members of the Sanctuary Movement to 
break the law.3 Second, it will examine current free exercise doc-
trine that may provide first amendment protection to Sanctuary 
workers,• concluding that the cases reflect two parallel, yet in-
compatible, rationales. Following one line of cases, Sanctuary ac-
tivity should be protected; following the other line, it should be 
condemned. Third, this Note will resolve the inconsistency of 
these rationales by proposing a new universal test for free exer-
cise claims. Fourth, it will explore the details of recent cases in-
volving Sanctuary workers who have raised free exercise de-
fenses to prosecutions by the government. Finally, this Note will 
use the proposed standard to evaluate the claims of Sanctuary 
workers, concluding that courts should recognize an affirmative 
defense to prosecution for transporting and harboring illegal 
aliens. 
l. BACKGROUND 
In order to appreciate why the Sanctuary workers feel com-
pelled to disobey the law, it is important to understand the his-
tory of the Sanctuary Movement and to discuss the responses to 
and regardless of any future official action which may be taken with re-
spect to such alien; 
(B) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, trans-
ports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the 
United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of 
such violation of law; 
(C) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, 
harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or 
shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or 
any means of transportation; or · 
(D) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the 
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such 
coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law, shall be 
fined in accordance with title 18, imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection 
occurs. 
3. For a reasonably objective analysis of the political history of Central America as it 
relates to the Sanctuary Movement, see Note, En El Nombre De Dios-The Sanctuary 
Movement: Development and Potential for First Amendment Protection, 89 W. VA. L. 
REV. 191 (1986). 
4. The first amendment states, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
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the workers' actions that are theoretically available to the gov-
ernment. The motivations behind the Sanctuary Movement also 
become significant in evaluating the plausibility of first amend-
ment protection. 
A. The Origins and Development of the 
Modern Sanctuary Movement0 
The modern American Sanctuary Movement originated in the 
early 1980's, when significant numbers of Central Americans (in-
cluding those from El Salvador and Guatemala) began attempt-
ing to cross the Mexican-American border. According to the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS), their purpose was, 
and is, to take advantage of the economic benefits (such as in-
creased employment opportunities) of living in the United 
States.8 Courts have noted the possibility, however, that the ref-
ugees' main purpose is to seek protection from the violence of 
their native countries. 7 
Prior to 1981, churches in border areas from Texas to Califor-
nia provided various kinds of assistance to aliens, including 
medical aid and bail money releasing refugees from INS custody 
while they awaited hearings on applications for asylum. In spite 
of what Sanctuary workers considered to be the INS's inability 
to evaluate fairly the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees' ap-
5. The bulk of the historical information contained here was originally presented in 
MacEoin, A Brief History of the Sanctuary Movement, in SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES' 
STRUGGLE 14 (G. MacEoin ed. 1985) [hereinafter RESOURCE GumE]. Resource Guide is a 
collection of papers presented at the Sanctuary Symposium sponsored by the Tucson 
Ecumenical Council's Task Force for Central America. 
6. The Elder court recognized the existence of conflicting assessments regarding the 
effects undocumented workers exert on the United States economy: 
David North, an immigration researcher who testified for the Government, con-
cluded that undocumented aliens drained social resources, depressed wages, dis-
placed minority and women workers, and impeded technological development in 
some sectors of the economy. Thomas Muller, an expert for the defense, found 
that undocumented immigrants filled unwanted jobs and helped to create new 
jobs and prosperity. . .. This existing controversy among experts proves, first, 
that the economic impact of illegal immigration remains unresolved and, second, 
that the Court should not resolve the dispute. 
601 F. Supp. at 1579. 
7. As one court said, "In short, the violent conditions in El Salvador are a matter of 
public record and are corroborated by all available accounts." Orantes-Hernandez v. 
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
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plications for asylum, the churches were able, through 1980, to 
post bond and secure work permits for many of those detained.8 
The change of presidential administrations in 1981 brought 
changes in INS policy: bond was increased tenfold or more, and 
work permits were denied.9 Sanctuary Movement leaders also 
claimed that the administrative hearings to determine the grant-
ing of asylum status became largely pro forma. Conforming their 
judgments to the administration's Central American policy, the 
judges involved allegedly gave little or no weight to refugees' 
claims of persecution in their home countries. Because acknowl-
edging claims of persecution at the hands of a U.S.-backed re-
gime might embarrass the government, applications for asylum 
from Central American refugees, especially those from El Salva-
dor, were routinely denied. 10 
These changes in immigration policy sparked a declaration by 
several border churches that they would consider themselves 
"sanctuaries" for Central American refugees.11 Initially, the 
Sanctuary churches merely asserted the right to shelter those 
fleeing Central America while the Sanctuary workers attempted 
to obtain "extended voluntary departure" status12 for the aliens. 
8. MacEoin, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
9. MacEoin, The Constitutional and Legal Aspects of the Refugee Crisis, in RE-
SOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5, at 125. 
10. See id. at 118-29. 
11. The declaration consisted of public ceremonies, taped and photographed by INS 
officials, welcoming masked Salvadorans into churches in Tucson, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, and San Francisco. MacEoin, supra note 5, at 22-
23. The date, March 24, 1982, was the second anniversary of the assassination of El 
Salvador's Archbishop Oscar Romero. Archbishop Romero had publicly denounced the 
sending of U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran government. Id. at 15. 
An important clarification to be made at this point is the distinction between the 
"older" view of religious sanctuary and the "modern" view. From the perspective of the 
person seeking asylum or, perhaps, from that of the INS, the two views are quite differ-
ent. From Biblical times onward, the right of sanctuary was supposed to be afforded 
those who had, in some sense, broken a law, though without moral culpability. Today, 
however, sanctuary is seen as a refuge for those who have fled their native lands, though 
not as a result of anything they have done or failed to do. From the perspective of the 
Sanctuary workers, the only relevant consideration in both cases is that "fellow creatures 
of God" need help, through no fault of their own. Although, in the modern situation, the 
Sanctuary worker is willing to work within whatever governmental framework happens 
to exist, the religious obligation to help takes priority over the governmental command 
to obey the law. For a balanced history of the ancient and medieval versions of sanctu-
ary, see Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misin-
terpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. C1N. L. REv. 747 (1986). 
12. "Extended voluntary departure" (EVD) status is designed to allow aliens to re-
main in the United States indefinitely, if their native countries are presently uninhabit-
able for some reason. When the alien may go home safely, the status is revoked. For an 
excellent discussion of the statutory basis of the Attorney General's broad power to grant 
EVD status to, or withhold it from, groups of immigrants, see Hotel & Restaurant Em-
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Today, however, with the spread of the Sanctuary Movement, 13 
and with the continued lack of cooperation between the Sanctu-
ary workers and the INS, a new "Underground Railroad" has 
developed to carry refugees to sanctuaries throughout the 
United States. The goal of this completely decentralized move-
ment continues to be obtaining legal status for these refugees. 
Because the movement's methods in getting the aliens into and 
settled within the United States are illegal, however, the govern-
ment has responded by prosecuting the Sanctuary workers.14 
B. The Options 
The tension between the state's legitimate interest in control-
ling immigration and the genuinely religious claims of Sanctuary 
workers may be resolved in three ways. First, courts could say 
that the free exercise of religion is such an important right that 
any alien reaching a sanctuary will be allowed to stay in this 
country, with no criminal prosecution of the Sanctuary worker. 
This is the most extreme free exercise claim, and it is essentially 
the one advanced by the defendants in the Sanctuary cases ex-
amined in Part IV. 
At the opposite extreme lies the second possible approach to 
this problem: courts might hold that there is no free exercise 
right to transport or harbor aliens. Under this analysis, the Fifth 
Circuit found any illegal alien in any sanctuary subject to the 
regular procedures of the INS, and any Sanctuary worker who 
harbors or smuggles such a refugee subject to criminal 
prosecution. H 
ployees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1270-72 (D.C. Cir. 1986). EVD 
status has been or currently is enjoyed by citizens of Uganda, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
Iran, Nicaragua, and Poland. Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and 
the 1980 Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 117, 128-29 n.60 (1983-84). Because the deci-
sion whether or not to extend such status is an executive one, the blanket grants often 
coincide with stated foreign policy objectives. See MacEoin, supra note 9, at 119. 
13. A 1986 report by the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America indicates 
that, in 1985, the Sanctuary Movement involved 307 declared sanctuaries in tlie United 
States. Note, supra note 3, at 205. Moreover, there is some indication that a similar 
movement is growing up in other western nations. Epstein & Turner, Sanctuary Concept 
Gaining Foothold in Western Europe: Religious Activists Offer Refuge Despite Govern-
ment Opposition, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 17, 1986, at 3, col. 1. 
14. See United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Remer-Thamert, No. 87-476 (D.N.M. Aug. 4, 1987); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 
1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985); United States v. Socorro, No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. 
1985). 
15. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 950 (denying defendant a putative free exercise right in light 
of important governmental policy considerations). 
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The third possible method of disposing of these cases sepa-
rates the fates of the aliens and the Sanctuary workers. The so-
lution posed by this Note would allow the INS to capture refu-
gees, but would recognize a first amendment-based affirmative 
defense for Sanctuary workers prosecuted for harboring aliens. 
The proposed defense springs from the principles announced in 
the "subjectivist" free exercise cases.16 These cases· focus on the 
subjective · belief of the claimant in granting first amendment 
protection. Their support for this Note's proposal becomes clear 
after examining the current paradoxical state of free exercise 
law. 
II. THE OBJECTIVE-SUBJECTIVE TENSION IN FREE EXERCISE 
DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court claims to apply a three-part test to free 
exercise claims: to be protected, 1) an activity must be the result 
of a sincere religious belief, 2) the governmental interest must 
not be compelling, and 3) if protection is denied, no less restric-
tive means to serve the compelling governmental interest may 
exist. 17 In reality, however, two distinct approaches to deciding 
free exercise cases, an objective test and a subjective test, are 
discernible. 
One method evaluates the claims with an objective standard 
of reasonableness, while the other focuses upon the subjective 
16. In addition to their free exercise claims, the Sanctuary workers have argued that 
both domestic and international law require that this country admit aliens whom they 
have attempted to help. Because these refugees had a right to be in this country, they 
cannot be considered "illegal" aliens, and, therefore, the statutory prohibition against 
harboring illegal aliens does not apply. See Merkt, 794 F.2d at 964; Elder, 601 F. Supp. 
at 1980. 
The claims that the aliens are not illegally in this country are based upon the Refugee 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C. and in 22 U.S.C. § 2601), and the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 622.23, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. 
Although these arguments present interesting questions of international law, examina-
tion of the merits of this claim is beyond the scope of the present Note. For an excellent 
discussion of this problem, see Comment, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Ob-
tain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITI'. L. REV. 295 (1985). 
17. For a brief discussion of this test, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, 1053-63 (2d ed. 1983). For application of the test to different factual situ-
ations, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indi-
ana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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belief of the claimant.18 The objective evaluation generally leads 
to a denial of the first amendment claim.19 Under this analysis, 
courts in effect determine whether the action sought to be pro-
tected is something most people would think deserves Constitu-
tional protection. The courts appear to attach particular signifi-
cance in this inquiry to several factors, including what the social 
impact of affording protection to the proscribed activity will 
be,20 how broadly the asserted right could be applied,21 and how 
threatening the underlying activity appears to b~.22 
The other path focuses upon the subjective belief of the actor 
and asks whether she sincerely believes that what she is doing is 
central to her religion. 23 Here, the factors courts view include 
18. This discussion of free exercise cases will assume throughout that the phenome-
non with which the Court is dealing is actually a "religion." Although this would be the 
first step in deciding the validity of any free exercise claim, most of these cases involve 
beliefs that would easily qualify as "religious." See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
In any event, it is clear that the Sanctuary Movement may be so characterized, as the 
court specifically found in Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577. 
19; See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding the imposition of 
Social Security taxes on members of the Old Order Amish, despite claimants' belief that 
it was wrong for them to accept or provide these benefits); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599 (1961) (plurality opinion) (refusing to enjoin· a Pennsylvania law requiring all busi-
nesses to close on Sundays; burden imposed by statute on orthodox Jewish merchants 
was "indirect"); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961) (citing 
Braunfeld); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that th\? Idaho territorial legis-
lature may validly refuse the vote to any person who advocates the practice of polyg-
amy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (upholding conviction of a Mor-
mon in the territory of Utah under a federal statute outlawing polygamy: "Congress was 
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was le<t free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."). 
20. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09; Davis, 133 U.S. at 
341; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167-68. 
21. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (upholding state's denial of Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children benefits to a Native American family who refused 
to obtain a social security number for their two-year-old daughter, despite claimants' 
belief that obtaining a social security number would violate their religious beliefs); Lee, 
455 U.S. at 260; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09; Davis, 133 U.S: at 341; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 
at 166-67. 
22. See Roy, 476 U.S. at 709-11; Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59; Davis, 133 U.S. at 342-43; 
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164, 165-66. 
23. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82, 86 (1944); see also Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716, (1981); cf. Hobbie v 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1048 n.2 (1987) (noting that it was 
"indisputed that appellant's . . . religious belief was sincerely held"); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (noting the state's stipulation to the sincerity of respon-
dents' beliefs); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.l (1963) (noting that the sincerity 
of appellant's beliefs was unquestioned). 
One must also note the Conscientious Objector cases. To qualify for an exemption 
from the draft on religious grounds, a Conscientious Objector need only show that "a 
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in ... [his] life ... parallel 
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion." Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see also Gillette v. United 
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the following: the likelihood that the claimant is attempting to 
mask a wholly secular motive with free exercise language,2" 
whether the claimant is representative of a larger group likely to 
seek similar protection, 211 how well established the practice 
sought to be protected is, 26 and whether the denial of protection 
is likely to communicate governmental hostility to sincere reli-
gious practices. 27 
After a court finds that a claimant's actions stem from a sin-
cere religious belief, it considers whether less restrictive means 
exist for the government to attain its legitimate end. Only if 
there are less restrictive means will an otherwise compelling gov-
ernment interest yield to an individual's right of free exercise. 
The objective-subjective tension, however, infects the "alternate 
means" inquiry also, for in all of the free exercise cases denying 
claims, less restrictive alternatives to the legitimate governmen-
tal interests were at least theoretically available. 28 
Despite the conflicting approaches, the Court consistently 
holds that a state may not force a citizen to choose between the 
free exercise right and other rights.29 Further, a claimant's be-
liefs need not be shared by all adherents of a particular faith 
before a court will protect the actions associated with the be-
lief. 30 In the Sanctuary cases, then, not all Roman Catholics 
must feel compelled to offer sanctuary to refugees, for example, 
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (finding exemption available only to those who professed 
opposition to war as such, not simply to those wars the applicant considers unjust); 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding that draftees were not required to 
oppose war on specifically religious grounds to qualify for exemption). 
24. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 82. 
25. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207, 216. 
26. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-11, 235; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. But see Thomas, 
450 U.S. at 715-16. 
27. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212, 218, 235; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
28. In Braunfeld, the Court, simply citing a "poor fit," could have restricted the 
State of Pennsylvania to requiring one day a week of rest for all workers, without speci-
fying the day. In Lee, there is no reason why the Old Order Amish could not have been 
exempted from paying Social Security taxes, given the complete homogeneity of that 
denomination's beliefs. Finally, in Roy, alternative ways of identifying the family's 
daughter were clearly available, though, as with the Lee case, such special provisions 
might have entailed additional administrative costs. 
29. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. "[N]ot only is it apparent that appellant's 
declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the 
pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable." Id. 
30. "[T]he resolution [of what is a "religious" belief or practice] is not to turn upon a 
judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
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for those Roman Catholics who do protect refugees to gain first 
amendment protection. 
The Court has never explicitly said that two ways of deciding 
free exercise cases exist. Yet, two observations make this a plau-
sible explanation. First, the members of the Supreme Court are 
naturally skeptical of exotic beliefs and practices seeking prQtec-
tion as "religious practices." Moreover, the Justices are unwill-
ing to afford broad Constitutional protection to amorphous and 
unorthodox religious ideas and practices, when such protection 
can have unpredictable and far-reaching effects. Second, if there 
is no tension between the subjective and objective standards, 
Sherbert 's insistence on accommodation cannot be reconciled 
with Braunfeld's emphasis on state interest, nor Yoder's defer-
ence to religious practices with the deference to state rules in 
Lee and Bowen. In short, the free exercise area can only make 
sense when one admits that conflicting standards are being 
applied. 
Ill. RESOLVING THE TENSION: A FREE EXERCISE PROPOSAL 
Some argue that a wholly subjectivist approach to free exer-
cise claims will lead to a flood of specious assertions of the right. 
This might be true, if it were not for the test announced in Wis-
consin v. Yoder. 31 This Part will elaborate on that test as a uni-
versal standard in free exercise cases and discuss and defuse 
some of the most obvious objections to its use. 
Under Yoder's tripartite evaluation, only those claims in 
which the contested action is 1) a matter of deep religious con-
viction, 2) shared by an organized group, and 3) intimately re-
lated to daily living will be protected. 32 The first element of this 
test really just restates the criterion of sincerity.33 The second 
and third elements, however, provide some measure of objectiv-
ity in evaluating the claim. The Yoder test provides the basis for 
a comprehensive interpretation of the free exercise clause that is 
new because it is both broader and possibly narrower than that 
we now have. It is possibly narrower because it affords auto-
matic protection only to those actions of organized religious 
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
32. Id. at 216. 
33. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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groups. 34 The test is also broader because it allows automatic 
protection for any organized religious group that can meet the 
other requirements.H In this way, the Yoder test provides a use-
ful synthesis of the objective and subjective approaches. 
It is the contention of this Note that, if the three Yoder re-
quirements are met, then any state interest, however compelling, 
must yield with respect to the protected group. This leaves no 
room for the "least restrictive alternative" language, because it 
is clear enough that a less restrictive alternative is always at 
least theoretically available. 36 
One objection to this test might be that it could allow religious 
groups qua religious groups to obtain advantages over nonreli-
gious groups, thus violating the establishment clause. Two re-
sponses defuse this objection. First, no violation of the establish-
ment clause occurs when religious people qua religious people 
receive positive benefits from their governments.37 Further, if 
one pushes this argument to its logical conclusion, then the free 
exercise clause ceases to have any independent meaning. If 
courts do not afford protection to religious activities as such, 
then the free exercise clause merely duplicates guarantees found 
in other Constitutional provisions. 
A more serious objection is that, even with the Yoder safe-
guard, a subjectivist test of free exercise claims allows for spe-
cious assertions of that right. Naturally, the free exercise right, 
once made out, is not unlimited. As Sherbert and, particularly, 
Yoder make clear, the law at issue may still be upheld. As the 
Thomas court asserted, "One can, of course, imagine an asserted 
claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to 
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause."38 This 
holds, however, only if the government shows that the interest it 
seeks to protect is compelling. "The essence of all that has been 
said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
34. This only possibly narrows the protection presently afforded under the free exer-
cise clause, because it is not clear that one-person religions or unorganized group reli-
gions enjoy a great deal of protection at present. 
35. The real question now becomes: Is this a bona fide "religious" group? The answer 
to such a question is beyond the scope of the present Note, though much interesting 
writing has been produced on the subject of the definition of "religion" for first amend-
ment purposes. See generally Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982). 
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963); accord Thomas v. Review Bd. of the 
Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). 
38. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
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legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."39 Nonetheless, 
the test is weakest on this point because it does not attempt a 
definition of "religion" or "religious activity" for free exercise 
purposes; rather, it assumes that whatever claims finally are pro-
tected as "religious" will not be sufficiently threatening to or-
dered liberty'0 to warrant their suppression. The concept of "or-
dered liberty" is necessarily quite elastic, but one hopes that 
judges will be sensitive both to individuals' beliefs and any real 
threat to society posed by such individuals' actions. 
Respect for offensive and even potentially subversive religious 
practices, as in the Conscientious Objector cases,41 is essential if 
conventional behavior is to remain clearly protected. Further-
more, it is precisely when out-of-the-ordinary claims are made 
that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights must be most scrupu-
lously guarded. If they are not, then they become nothing more 
than goals on a liberal majority's agenda. 
IV. THE SANCTUARY CASES 
This Part examines the prosecutions of the Sanctuary work-
ers. It then considers the arguments raised against the claim of a 
free exercise right to harbor illegal aliens. 
A. Elder, Merkt, and Beyond 
Those Sanctuary workers indicted, prosecuted, and impris-
oned for violating the immigration laws have raised free exercise 
claims as defenses. In two Sanctuary cases, United States v. 
Elder•2 and United States v. Merkt, 43 the defendants asserted 
the right, founded upon their religious convictions,"" to extend 
aid to persecuted refugees, regardless of the INS policy on the 
subject. In responding to these claims, the courts have held con-
sistently that the importance of the governmental interests in-
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added). 
40. Like the problem of what constitutes a "religious practice," the problem of what 
is essential for the preservation of ordered liberty poses difficulties beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
41. See supra note 23. 
42. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
43. 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986). 
44. For an explanation of the theological bases of these beliefs, see generally supra 
note 11 and RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 5. 
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volved outweighs the free exercise interests raised by the de-
fendants. As the Court in Merkt stated, "[a]ppellants' 'do it 
yourself immigration policy, even if grounded in sincerely held 
religious conviction, is irreconcilably, voluntarily, and knowingly 
at war with the duly legislated border control policy. . . . [T]he 
claims of conscience must yield to the ... imperative[] of ... 
preservation of our national identity as defined by the immigra-
tion laws."0 
B. The Arguments Against a Free Exercise Right 
The primary argument used against the first amendment de-
fense of Sanctuary workers is that important governmental in-
terests in regulating the nation's borders preclude the exercise of 
the right.•6 This alleged governmental interest is a way of 
describing many other subsidiary interests, such as the regula-
tion of potential job-seekers who could be competing with citi-
zens for certain types of employment. 
In addition to the governmental interests at stake, the courts 
have been particularly careful to note other situations in which 
free exercise of religion claims have been denied as defenses to 
criminal prosecutions. In Merkt!7 the Fifth Circuit analogized 
the claims of Sanctuary workers to cases in which free exercise 
defenses were insufficient to excuse destruction of government 
property,48 racketeering,49 and refusal to testify before a grand 
45. 794 F.2d at 957. The courts' failure to appreciate other constitutional rights may 
be seen· in the Elder court's decision to prohibit Elder from speaking publicly about the 
Sanctuary Movement. 2 Who Aided Salvadorans Get Jail Sentences, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
28, 1985, at A20, col. 1. 
In addition to the criminal prosecutions, however, churches whose members were in-
dicted in the Socorro case filed two civil suits, one of which is currently pending: Presby-
terian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. v. United States, CIV 86-0072 PHXCLH (D. Ariz. 1986) 
(government's motion to dismiss granted Oct. 23, 1986) and American Baptist Churches 
v. Meese, No. C-85-3255 RFP (government's motion to dismiss denied, 666 F. Supp. 1358 
(N.D. Cal. 1987)). The allegations in those cases are based upon actions taken by INS 
agents in investigating the activities of the churches. 
46. See Merkt, 794 F.2d at 957. Although the Court in Merkt also mentioned the 
evenhanded enforcement of the nation's criminal laws as an important goal, the Consci-
entious Objector cases suggest that that goal may sometimes be compromised, since fail-
ure to serve in the military may be a criminal offense. See supra note 23. The stronger 
argument against a free exercise right in this context, then, seems to be the one based 
upon the need to regulate our nation's borders. 
47. 794 F.2d at 954-55. 
48. United States v. Allen 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985) (attempting to destroy nuclear 
weapons not protected, even if religiously motivated). 
49. United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1982) (sustaining indictment al-
leging that RICO violations occurred as part of defendants' religious practices, despite 
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jury.110 Although the proposed standard does not attempt to de-
fine "religion" for the purposes of the free exercise clause,111 
racketeering and other criminal acts seem sufficiently inimical to 
the concept of ordered liberty, even if genuinely "religious," to 
be beyond first amendment protection. This possibility was rec-
ognized by the Court in Yoder: "[T]he very concept of ordered 
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own stan-
dards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has im-
portant interests. "112 
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAIM 
The primary assurance of a viable free exercise right comes 
from the subjective standard announced in cases such as 
Cantwell u. Connecticut,63 United States u. Ballard/• Sherbert 
v. Verner,11 11 and Thomas u. Review Board of the Indiana Em-
ployment Security Diuision.116 These stand for the proposition 
that sincerely held religious beliefs that motivate the actions of 
individuals deserve constitutional protection. The Yoder test 
limits the exercise of this right in the face of governmental regu-
lation by providing some objectively verifiable elements that do 
not go to the substance of the belief held. In the Sanctuary 
cases, the governmental policy is forcing a choice between obedi-
ence to the law and the exercise of sincerely held religious be-
liefs. This Part applies the Yoder test to the claims of the Sanc-
tuary workers and provides a solution respecting the interests of 
both sides. 
possible negative reflection upon the underlying religious beliefs), cert. denied, .460 U.S. 
1092 (1983). 
50. Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 409 U.S. 944 (1972) (holding that a refusal to testify before a grand 
jury due to possible "[d)ivine punishment and ostracism from the Jewish community" as 
an "informer" was outweighed by the state's interest in the testimony). 
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
52. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
53. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
54. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
55. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
56. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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A. Sincerity of Belief 
The Elder court recognized that a valid free exercise right was 
established in the Sanctuary cases.117 The religious basis of the 
Sanctuary Movement is sufficient to meet the first Yoder re-
quirement that the action be motivated by a deeply held reli-
gious belief. Further, there can be little doubt that the Sanctu-
ary Movement, though decentralized, is an organized group, 
satisfying the second component of the Yoder test. The move-
ment's ability to shuttle aliens from the border to churches 
throughout the nation illustrates this.118 Finally, the Sanctuary 
Movement meets the third requirement, that the actions be inti-
mately related to the workers' daily lives. The convictions dic-
tate workers' daily routines as fully as if the workers had en-
tered monastic orders: opening churches to refugees, providing 
for their needs, and attempting to secure legal status for them 
all require enormous sacrifice and work. 
B. The Affirmative Defense 
An affirmative defense to the specific crimes of transporting 
and harboring illegal aliens, modeled on the principles enunci-
ated above, could be established by registration of the worker's 
name and home address with the INS. The presumption of first 
amendment protection would be confirmed, if at all, at trial, by 
whatever evidence could be produced to prove the sincerity of 
the worker's beliefs. As with the Conscientious Objector exemp-
tion and other affirmative defenses, the possibility would remain 
that the requisite elements of the defense would not be estab-
lished, thus providing protection against a flood of "fair 
weather" workers.119 
The use of an affirmative defense would not undervalue the 
government's interests in the enforcement of immigration law. 
Allowing an affirmative defense to the Sanctuary workers in-
volved would not decrease the number of patrols along the bor-
ders, it would not prevent the INS from arresting any aliens it 
57. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
59. For a sweeping view of the Conscientious Objector exemption, see Brown, Kohn 
& Kohn, Conscientious Objection: A Constitutional Right, 21 NEW ENG. L. R.Ev. 545 
(1985-86). 
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finds, and it would not entail any change in the INS's deporta-
tion hearings. 
The potential adverse effects of an affirmative defense are 
highly speculative. First, such a defense would not make more 
Central Americans willing to risk coming to the United States, 
for there would be no real reason for them to be any more hope-
ful about their becoming legal residents here. It is absurd, as 
well, to assume that Central Americans can be more highly moti-
vated to get out of their countries than they already are. Second, 
hundreds of "closet" Sanctuary workers would not surface if the 
threat of punishment disappeared. In fact, Sanctuary workers 
already declare themselves as being such to anyone who cares to 
know.60 
The most obvious change to result from the use of an affirma-
tive defense modeled upon that afforded Conscientious Objec-
tors would be, ironically, that the regulation of the flow of Cen-
tral Americans might actually become easier. Sanctuary workers 
might feel freer to admit their activities and, thus, inadvertently 
disclose where refugees are likely to be hidden. Although 
churches that harbor aliens already publicly announce their sta-
tus as sanctuaries, it may be that the INS could benefit by trail-
ing the workers to their churches, so that they would be certain 
of finding the correct location. This benefit to the INS makes 
the Fifth Circuit's characterization of the proposed situation as 
a "catch-me-if-you-can"61 scenario the least likely possibility: 
Sanctuary workers are not running from anyone. 
The assertion of an affirmative defense by the Sanctuary 
worker would not free captured refugees. They would still be 
turned over to the INS. But opportunities to avoid deportation 
still exist within the INS system,62 and workers truly concerned 
with helping refugees at this stage could provide legal counsel 
during deportation hearings.63 This too would allow workers to 
act on their religious beliefs without being punished. 
60. See MacEoin, supra note 5, at 14. 
61. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1986). 
62. For a general description of the process involved in avoiding deportation, see 
Note, supra note 3, at 196-201. 
63. Although the hearing process itself may be in need of reform, that question is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
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This Note has suggested a universal standard for evaluating 
free exercise claims, using the Sanctuary Movement as an exam-
ple of how the standard could work. The success of Sanctuary 
workers' claims of a free exercise right to transport and harbor 
illegal aliens depends largely upon whether courts adopt the 
"objective" approach to evaluating free exercise claims or the 
"subjective" approach. This fact suggests an unfortunate conclu-
sion: current free exercise law is confused, and courts are able to 
allow or prohibit virtually any kind of novel religious activity, 
depending upon which line_ of analysis they choose to follow. 
This proposal is merely an elaboration of the test used by the 
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder. It provides Constitu-
tional protection to only those actions that may, in some sense, 
be objectively defended, while respecting the variety of sincere 
beliefs of religious people, such as the Sanctuary workers. 
-Troy Harris 
